



SENTENCING INDIGENOUS RIOT OFFENDERS IN A SPATIAL 
FANTASY 
Thalia Anthony* 
There is precedent in Australian criminal sentencing to 
consider Indigenous group membership as a mitigating factor, 
including for Indigenous riots against racist acts or deaths in 
custody. When mitigation has been invoked, it is based on the 
reduced moral culpability of the Indigenous offender. A number 
of higher courts, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, pointed to 
the stress caused by racism that provoked the riot. However, 
recent sentencing remarks have tended to privilege 
aggravating circumstances, especially the seriousness of the 
riot and the harm or potential harm to the victims. This shift in 
sentencing considerations for rioters dovetails a reimagining of 
the Indigenous offenders and their communities as lacking 
reason or legitimacy in the contest for space. This article 
analyses key sentencing remarks and media reports for New 
South Wales and Queensland Indigenous riot cases over the 
past 30 years by drawing on Stanley Cohenʼs concept of ʻmoral 
panicsʼ and Ghassan Hageʼs notion of spatial racism to 
demonstrate how the construction of riots as an out-of-control 
response reflects a deeper national anxiety over ʻwhiteʼ space. 
Whether the offence is riotous or righteous, criminal sentencing provides 
unique opportunities for individualised justice. While normative sentencing 
principles, such as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and community 
protection, frame judicial discretion, such discretion is exercised with 
reference to the offender’s background and circumstances. Sentencing 
principles are enshrined in legislation across Australia, including section 3A 
of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) and section 9(1) of 
the Penalties and Sentencing Act 1992 (Qld). At the same time, the High 
Court of Australia has remarked that courts have discretion to ‘take account 
of all relevant factors’.1 Judicial discretion ensures ‘individualised justice’ 
by requiring ‘that all of the wide variations of circumstances of the offence 
and the offender are taken into account’.2 Individualised justice is a long-
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1  Wong v The Queen; Leung v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 611 (emphasis in 
original). 
2  R v Whyte (2002) 134 A Crim R 53 at 77 (Spigelman CJ). 
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standing principle in Australian sentencing3 and has withstood the trend to 
fixed penalties in the United States.4 Tata likens sentencing to craftwork, 
where the craftworker aims for consistency in applying rules, but 
nonetheless leaves a personal signature to signify that the work was treated 
as uniquely individual.5 Part of the discretionary patchwork includes the 
offender’s background, cultural identity and group membership.6  
Mitigating and aggravating factors are set out in legislation in 
Queensland and New South Wales. In Queensland, section 9(2)(g) of the 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 provides that the court ‘must have regard 
to the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the 
offender’. It outlines a range of specific considerations including, since an 
amendment in 2000, ‘any submissions made by a representative of the 
community justice group in the [Indigenous] offender’s community’ under 
section 9(2)(p).7 In New South Wales, section 21A of the Crimes Sentencing 
Procedure Act 1999 lists the mitigating and aggravating factors for the court 
to consider, as well as providing the sentencing court with discretion to 
consider other relevant objective or subjective factors. Indigenous 
background does not represent a mitigating or aggravating factor per se. The 
common law establishes that Indigenous group membership is one of the 
many ‘material facts’ that courts are ‘bound to take into account’ when 
imposing sentences.8 There is a body of case law on specific facts that may 
be relevant to Indigenous offenders, including the socioeconomic 
disadvantage of their community (R v Fernando),9 the existence of 
Indigenous laws and cultural practices (R v Shannon)10 and the dispensation 
of punishment on the offender by his/her Indigenous community (R v 
Minor).11 
                                                           
3   Gleeson (1995). 
4  Edney and Bagaric (2007), p 16. However, mandatory prison sentences have crept in to 
Western Australian legislation (in relation to burglary: Criminal Code Compilation Act 
(WA), s 401(4)) and Northern Territory legislation (in relation to certain violent offenders 
and sexual offenders: Sentencing Act (NT), ss78BA–BB). 
5  Tata (2007), pp 426, 437. 
6  Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 326. 
7  Such submissions were put in Lex Wotton’s case: The Queen v Lex Patrick Wotton [2008] 
Townsville District Court (Unreported, 7 November, TOWN3/2008) at 13. Although there 
is little authority on section 9(2)(p), it has been relied on to accept community justice 
submissions on the defendant’s role in ensuring her children’s attendance at school where 
Aboriginal school attendance rates are low in the community (R v Chong; ex parte A-G 
(Qld) [2008] QCA 22 at [9]–[11]). The provision is also the legislative basis for the 
establishment of the Murri Courts in Queensland: Hennessy (2006).  
8  Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 326 (Brennan J). 
9  R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58. 
10  R v Shannon (1991) 56 A Crim R 56. 
11  R v Minor (1992) 105 FLR 180. See generally on Indigenous sentencing factors, Anthony 
(2010). 
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Criminologists suggest that judicial recognition of individual offender 
circumstances, particularly socioeconomic background, contributes to fairer 
outcomes in sentencing.12 It recognises the culpability of the offender and 
their relative lack of choice over their actions. Tonry justifies sentencing 
mitigation for the poor by reasoning that their actions are less culpable than 
those who are not so afflicted.13 Hudson goes so far as to argue that 
accommodation of an offender’s poorer economic conditions should be 
based on ‘principled criteria’ rather than ‘individual representations for 
particularly sympathetic cases’.14 This call for the application of principled 
criteria is supported by Tata’s observation that judicial officers ‘become 
wearied by narratives about deprivation and social disadvantage’ in pre-
sentence reports.15 Hudson asserts that, due to ‘widening social inequalities’ 
that limit offenders’ choices, ‘justice demands that society acknowledge 
responsibility [for the economic hardship] by assisting the offender’ in 
sentencing.16 She states that ‘the extent to which [offenders] are to be blamed 
– and therefore punished – should reflect these differences and 
inequalities’.17  
By failing to consider individual factors, criminologists argue that 
offenders receive sentences disproportionate to their culpability.18 Ashworth 
criticises sentencing calculations based on the seriousness of the harm and 
the assumption of offender autonomy, given that ‘strong social 
disadvantages may be at the root of much offending’.19 In relation to 
Indigenous offenders, Gray and colleagues argue that special consideration 
should be given to ‘Aboriginality’ in sentencing because otherwise ‘racism 
[emerges] by way of adherence to values, systems, procedures and outcomes 
that exclude others of a different culture and background’.20 Sentencing 
should involve reintegrative strategies for disadvantaged offenders, 
according to McCoy. She remarks that ‘fashioning sentencing structures’ to 
take account of ‘social inequality, true psychological pathologies of some 
individuals, and culpability of members of a common moral community’ 
would integrate ‘members of the underclass’ into the ‘common 
community’.21  
This criminological literature on sentencing is valuable for analysing 
Indigenous offenders who have been sentenced for riot offences. This is not 
                                                           
12  Hudson (1999), p 583. However, there is also a coterie of criminologists who regard 
incarceration as the only rational response to criminals, such as Bennett et al (1996). 
13  Tonry (1995), p 125. 
14  Hudson (1999), p 583. 
15  Tata (2010), p 246. 
16  Hudson (1999), pp 589–90. 
17  Hudson (1999), p 585. 
18  Ashworth (2002), p 1079; Hudson (1999), p 564. 
19  Ashworth (2005), p 86. 
20  Gray et al (2008), p 119. 
21  McCoy (1997), pp 611–12. 
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only because they come from low socioeconomic backgrounds, but also 
because they have limited means of redress when the provoking racist act is 
inflicted by the government or police who are meant to provide protection 
from such acts. To varying degrees, the sentencing remarks discussed below 
recognise this limited choice. However, a principled body of case law 
addressing the criminological concern that sentencing should account for 
offenders’ narrowed choices and society’s contribution to social inequalities 
and prejudices is yet to develop. 
Offsetting Indigeneity in Riot Cases 
This article analyses a corpus of sentencing remarks for Indigenous 
offenders who were convicted of assault or riot for violently protesting 
against police or government officials for their racist acts or involvement in 
a death in custody or police chase. The protesters in these cases were also 
expressing broader grievances about systemic and institutional 
discrimination against Indigenous people.22 The riots represented not 
individual attacks but rather a contest over space and its appropriation by 
white control. The sentencing remarks were delivered for offenders who 
protested through assaulting (spitting on) a government officer on Yarrabah 
Reserve (North Queensland) in 1981;23 rioting against the death in police 
custody of an Indigenous man at Brewarrina (Western New South Wales) in 
1987;24 rioting in 2004 against the death on a police chase in Redfern, 
Sydney;25 and rioting (including with destruction to property) against the 
death in custody on Palm Island, Queensland in 2004.26 
These sentencing remarks illustrate how courts variously imagine the 
Indigenous background of the offender and their community. In the earlier 
sentencing remarks in relation to Yarrabah27 and Brewarrina,28 the appellate 
courts demonstrated an appreciation of the personal stress the offenders were 
under during the offences due to discrimination, paternalism and over-
policing. Their circumstances reduced the offenders’ culpability, and in turn 
the seriousness of their offence and the sentence. These appellate courts 
treated the seriousness of the offence as encapsulating culpability. It would 
later be divorced from individual culpability and linked exclusively to harm 
or potential harm in justifying harsher sentences for the Redfern and Palm 
                                                           
22  See: Funnell (2005); Cunneen (2007). 
23  Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305. 
24  R v Murray, R v Bates [1992] NSWCCA (Unreported, 6 April, CCA 60322 of 1991, CCA 
60343 of 1991); R v Boney [1991] NSWCCA (Unreported, 22 July, No 60342/91). 
25 R v Cargill [2005] NSWDC (Unreported, 6 January, Audio recording of proceedings). 
26  R v Poynter, Norman & Parker; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] QCA 517; The Queen v Lex 
Patrick Wotton [2008] Townsville District Court (Unreported, 7 November, 
TOWN3/2008). 
27  Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 325;  
28  R v Boney [1991] NSWCCA (Unreported, 22 July, No 60342/91) at 6. 
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Island rioters.29 Criminological theory has highlighted that a ‘central 
dimension’ of the seriousness of the offence is the offender’s culpability, and 
this should be capable of reducing a sentence.30  
The Redfern and Palm Island riot cases resonate with the broader penal 
shift from a primary concern with the offender’s culpability to the victim’s 
harm (or, more likely, potential harm).31 The law and order turn has been 
characterised by a penal focus on vindicating the victim by providing 
punishment proportionate to the harm to the victim.32 The seriousness of the 
offence, both in sentencing and popular perceptions, therefore is measured 
increasingly against the impact on the victim rather than the circumstances 
of the offender. In The Culture of Control, Garland remarks that the victim is 
routinely invoked ‘in support of measures of punitive segregation’.33 Pratt 
reminds us that the harm inflicted on victims is treated as harm inflicted on 
the rest of society to justify ‘much greater penal severity’.34 The new 
punitive focus on the dangerous offender and vulnerable victim is based on 
‘the quite distinct logic of risk calculation’.35 It is distinct from earlier 
inquiries into the circumstances of the offender, including their environment, 
group membership and motivations.36 The emphasis is on the ideal victim,37 
who ‘consists of a category of individuals who – when hit by crime – most 
readily are given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim’.38 
They are characterised by weakness (especially in relation to the offender), 
performing a respectable role and having a virtuous moral character.39 
Sentencing courts’ narration of police as such victims mutes the wrongdoing 
of the police in deaths in custody and attempts to create a fantasy of racial 
neutrality in the management of space.40 
                                                           
29  New South Wales District Court quoted in Levett and Kennedy (2004), p 6; R v Poynter, 
Norman & Parker; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] QCA 517 at [15], [21], [28]; The Queen v 
Lex Patrick Wotton [2008] Townsville District Court (Unreported, 7 November, 
TOWN3/2008) at 4. 
30  Von Hirsch (2004), p361. See also Ashworth (2005); Easton and Piper (2005), p 60. 
31  Garland (2001); Pratt (2008); Hogg (2008). 
32  See Garland (2001); Simon (2007). 
33  Garland (2001), p 11. 
34  Pratt (2008), p 272. 
35  Tata (2007), p 433. See also O’Malley (2004). 
36  Ashworth (2005); Easton and Piper (2005), p 60; Ashworth (2002), p 1106; Von Hirsch 
(2004), p 361. 
37  This is evidenced in: R v Poynter, Norman & Parker; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] QCA 517 
at [5], [29], [33]. 
38  Christie (1986), p 18. 
39  Crenshaw (1991), p 1278. 
40  Hage (1998). 
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Moral Panics, Riots and Contested Space 
Courts in riot cases that have downplayed factors relating to culpability have 
also imagined the Indigenous community as lacking rational capacity. This 
echoes a moral panic about the threat of Indigenous people to the social 
order. In the Palm Island case, the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal 
regarded the Indigenous offenders as being out of control and not reasonably 
responding to an injustice.41 The sentencing remarks concluded that the 
offenders had the same set of choices as other people42 rather than, in the 
words of Hudson, having ‘increased pressures towards crime’.43 In the 
sentencing of the Redfern and Palm Island rioters, their marginalised 
position in relations with police and their ongoing contest over space was not 
averred either by the courts or in the mainstream media.44 Commenting on 
the reporting of the Redfern riot, Gargett points to the media’s erasure of the 
narrative of ‘desperation and frustration’ within the Indigenous community.45 
Cunneen argues in relation to the Palm Island riot that the media ignored 
questions of why the act occurred and produced a story of ‘blind, lawless 
purposelessness’.46 Instead, the media highlighted Indigenous people’s 
dysfunctionality and pathos to create a story of ‘passive victims’ who were 
‘without clear intention or rational motivations for engaging in particular 
activities’.47 The rioters were denied a role in creating their own political 
space through their resistance.48 
The mainstream media’s characterisation of Indigenous riots can be 
described in Cohen’s terms as creating ‘moral panic’. The participants were 
presented as irrational deviants and outsiders who were placing Australian 
society ‘under imminent threat’.49 Cohen writes that a moral panic arises 
when a: 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become 
defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; 
the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and 
other right-thinking people.50 
                                                           
41  R v Poynter, Norman & Parker; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] QCA 517 at [36], [39].  
42  R v Poynter, Norman & Parker; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] QCA 517 at [71]. 
43  Hudson (1999), p 589. 
44  Morris (2001), p 261. 
45  See, for example, Gargett (2005), p 9. 
46  Cunneen (2007), p 23.  
47  Cunneen (2007), p 23. 
48  Cowlishaw (2004), p 242. 
49  Johnston (1991), p 186. 
50  Cohen (2002), p 1. 
ANTHONY: SENTENCING INDIGENOUS RIOTER OFFENDERS 391 
 
The characterisation of ‘riots’ as ‘chaotic spontaneity’, according to 
Scraton,51 undermines their status as ‘reasoned responses’ to discriminatory 
policing. Silver explains that defining popular protests as criminal acts 
pursued by disorganised ‘rabble’ ensures their illegitimacy and reinforces 
the legitimate response of the police.52 During the trials and sentencing of 
Indigenous rioters examined in this article, the media sought to undercut the 
rationality of the riot and vindicate the police victims.  
Historical and anthropological analyses of riots suggest that they are 
‘articulate protests against genuine grievances’.53 Rationality, rather than 
irrationality, according to Fogelson, is among a riot’s ‘most crucial 
features’.54 In his classic essay on nineteenth century English riots, Silver 
refers to their socioeconomic-political nature,55 whereas Cowlishaw 
describes Indigenous riots as also having cultural, spatial and historical 
meanings.56 For Silver, riots served an important social function: to 
communicate ‘the desires of the population’ to elites.57 Historians and 
anthropologists note that riots are organic, with varying levels of 
organisation,58 restraint59 and impulsiveness.60 Individuals may not perceive 
themselves as being involved in an organised act.61 Some are responding to 
the direct provocation of and enticement by the police.62 Police violence in 
response to a crowd can lead rioters to adopt ‘an exaggerated form of 
destructive mayhem and defiance’.63 Alternatively, some Indigenous rioters 
have attempted to assist the police by preventing their harm. This is noted by 
Cowlishaw in relation to the 1997 Bourke riot,64 and was alleged in Lex 
Wotton’s sentencing submissions on his involvement in the Palm Island 
riot.65  
The portrayal of riots in the white media and political circles assumes a 
‘homogenous [Indigenous] citizenry’, with invalid claims to space.66 It fails 
to recognise that Indigenous identity is not only linked to race, but also to 
                                                           
51  Scraton (2007), p 25. 
52  Silver (1976), p 15. 
53  Fogelson (1968), p 37.  
54  Fogelson (1968), p 37. 
55  Silver (1976), p 6. 
56  Cowlishaw (2004), p 242. 
57  Silver (1976), p 15. 
58  The author would like to thank the anonymous referee for this observation. 
59  Fogelson (1968), p 37. 
60  Cowlishaw (2004), p 75. 
61  Cowlishaw (2004), p 236. 
62  Cowlishaw (2004), p 76. 
63  Cowlishaw (2004), p 75. 
64  Cowlishaw (2004), p 69. 
65  The Queen v Lex Patrick Wotton [2008] Townsville District Court (Unreported, 
7 November, TOWN3/2008) at 8–9. 
66  Cowlishaw (2004), p 237. 
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territory.67 This is a feature of Australian nationalist ideology, which asserts 
that claims to territory can only be made by European Australians.68 For 
Hage, the ‘whiteness’69 of space has critical significance for settler societies 
that are based on the creation of an ‘imagined community’ and ‘internal 
orientalism’.70 Nationalism is based on ‘spatial management’, involving the 
preservation of an ‘imagined privileged relation’ over ‘race’ and ‘national 
space’.71 Ang also notes that ‘white racism in the Australian context has 
peculiarities which have to do with the spatial dimensions of this settler 
colonial project’.72 The distance of the ‘mother country’ produced ‘a 
particularly antipodean sense of place, a spatial consciousness of self and of 
the world moulded by the experience of occupying this vast, distant land, 
which was perceived as nearly empty’.73 She explains that the  
totalising nature of British annexation and control paved the way … 
for the creation of ‘one Australia’ … imagined in terms of a 
transplanted British homogeneity. In other words, what was produced 
here was the collapsing into one of physical and human geography, 
which had a powerful imaginative effect on the white settlers. It 
provided the fledgling settler society with a singular sense of spatial 
identity.74 
The riot brings to the fore this contest over territory. As a collective act, 
the riot seeks to ‘force political matters into view’,75 and to construct a 
political challenge.76 In the words of Cowlishaw, the Indigenous riot is 
‘ordered around a conversation with whitefellas’.77 It creates ‘a productive 
space where racialized bodies carry powerful messages’ and ‘police stand 
accused of interfering in others’ domestic spaces’.78 Cowlishaw notes that 
‘violent actions are needed to shatter the complacency and moral superiority 
                                                           
67  Frankenberg argues that race is constructed as much through place as through more 
orthodox indicators such as physical appearance: Frankenberg (1993), pp 43–70. 
68  Hage (1998), p 32. 
69  ‘Whiteness’ is a cultural historical construct: Hage (1998), pp 58–59. It involves ‘both a 
European monopolisation of “civilised humanity” and a parallel monopolisation of 
Whiteness as its marker’: Hage (2003), pp 49–50.  
70  Hage (1998), p 17, emphasis in original. This draws on Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined 
community’, which is determined without reference to the actual members of the 
community, and Edward Said’s Orientalism, in which the Other is reduced to a passive 
object of government.  
71  Hage (1998), p 38. 
72  Ang (1999), p 191. 
73  Ang (1999), p 191. 
74  Ang (1999), p 192. 
75  Cowlishaw (2004), pp 244–45. 
76  Cowlishaw (2004), p 75. 
77  Cowlishaw (2004), p 195. 
78  Cowlishaw (2004), p 245. 
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[over Indigenous people] that accompany and naturalize the state power’.79 
The destruction of property is an attack on the economic control of towns by 
whites, and sends a message about the ‘clumsy limit of police power’.80 
However, the rioters’ claims to space do not receive the same national 
attention as the deniers of their space. Although the riot can be regarded as a 
spatial contest, it is the ‘spatial managers’, including the courts and media, 
who are entitled to publicise their opinions about those who do not belong 
and should be excluded from the space.81 By contrast, the ‘spatially 
managed’ have opinions expressed about them.82 This constructs the 
managed not only as inferior but ‘as an object of spatial exclusion’.83 Media 
and court representations of Indigenous rioters as uncontained rabble are a 
legacy of the colonial mentality that allowed Indigenous people to be 
segregated and their places to be claimed and named by whites.84 
Spatial encounters defined the organisation of ‘settler’ space in Redfern 
and Palm Island. These two sites exemplify divergent approaches to 
colonisation in Australia. Redfern is a place that Aboriginal people have 
struggled to hold on to, and it remains ‘embattled’.85 Aboriginal people at 
Redfern were dispossessed of their land in the early nineteenth century 
despite resistance led by Pemulwuy. From the late nineteenth century, 
Aboriginal people returned to Redfern to take up employment on the railway 
and reclaim a pocket of their land. Over the next century, the Aboriginal 
population grew to 12,000 by 1965 and Redfern became a home for the 
Aboriginal rights movement.86 Anderson notes that ‘Redfern became a 
sphere of [I]ndigenous protest, an heroic site of resistance to European 
culture and colonialist control’.87 In 1973, the Aboriginal Housing Company 
bought housing in an area of Redfern88 that would come to be known as ‘The 
Block’.89 This purchase was regarded as ‘part of the process of self-
determination and reconciliation’.90  It has since been ‘owned and occupied’ 
by the Aboriginal community,91 and ‘remains the symbolic heart of 
(post)colonial political struggle’.92 
                                                           
79  Cowlishaw (2004), p 245. 
80  Cowlishaw (2004), p 75. 
81  Hage (1998), pp 42–46. 
82  Hage (1998), pp 42–46. 
83  Hage (1998), p 48. 
84  See Rutherford (2000), pp 31–32; Curthoys (1999), p 281.  
85  Shaw (2000), p 291. 
86  Redfern Residents for Reconciliation (2011).  
87  Anderson (1993), p 81. 
88  Spark (2003), pp 34–35. 
89  The Block is bounded by Eveleigh, Caroline, Louis and Vine Streets.   
90  McAuliffe (2009), p 627. 
91  Forbes-Boyte (2009), p 153 
92  Shaw (2000), p 298. 
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Since its beginnings, The Block has been challenged by high-level 
policing and popular criticisms that the area ‘is imploding in a sea of drugs, 
crime and cultural inferiority’93 and is an example of ‘failed (urban) 
Aboriginal self-determination’.94 Narratives of the out-of-‘placeness’ of 
urban Aboriginal people help to justify white claims to The Block.95 
Aboriginal struggles and achievements at Redfern are constructed as inferior 
to the progress of ‘colonial capitalism’.96 Spark reminds us that: 
As tempting as it may be to imagine spaces apart from their corporeal 
realities, these are illusory: there are no places of self-determination 
that exist outside places produced through colonialism and 
assimilation.97 
In the late 1990s, the gentrification of inner-city Sydney emerged as ‘the 
latest phase of capitalism’s re-colonisation of inner city residential space’.98 
The Redfern Riot, which brought the spatial contest over Redfern into sharp 
relief, sparked calls from the New South Wales opposition leader for 
‘bulldozers’ to ‘flatten the area known as the Block’.99  
The genesis of Palm Island as a colonial space took a different track 
from Redfern. Settler space was organised along penal lines from 1918, and 
Indigenous people from the mainland were often detained there for violating 
Queensland’s Aboriginal Protection Act.100 The purpose of the penal 
settlement, as stated by Queensland’s Chief Protector of Aboriginals in the 
early twentieth century, was to confine and punish Indigenous ‘troublesome 
cases’ and assure colonial expansion on the mainland.101 Punishment was 
harsh, including incarceration in the watch-house, and could be inflicted on 
an Indigenous person for novel reasons such as laughing.102 The spatial 
boundaries were fiercely enforced by whites on the island, and Indigenous 
people were unable to visit white zones.103 They also could not walk into 
shops but had to queue for rations, and had to ‘salute any white person they 
passed’.104 Despite Palm Island being inhabited by its own Indigenous and 
non-detainee population,105 Indigenous residents could not escape the 
                                                           
93  Shaw (2000), p 291. 
94  Shaw (2000), p 291. 
95  Shaw (2007). 
96  Anderson (1999), p 215. 
97  Spark (2003), p 36. 
98  Shaw (2000), p 296. 
99  Anon (2004e). 
100  Watson (2010). 
101  Watson (2010), p 18. 
102  Watson (2010), p 104. 
103  Watson (2010), p 110. 
104  Watson (2010), p 82. 
105  Watson (2010), p 19. 
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criminal label and the ensuing policing and white control.106 Nonetheless, 
Indigenous people on the island continue to resist white policy, echoing the 
opposition to the Aboriginal Protection Act that brought many to the island. 
Such resistance materialised in a 1957 strike against withholding Indigenous 
wages and the violent rule by white authorities, and through protesting in the 
white zones, as well as in the establishment of the Palm Island Aboriginal 
Community Council. In 2004, the Palm Island riot exposed the ongoing 
tensions with white authority. Similar spatial struggles are apparent on other 
reserves, such as Yarrabah, discussed in relation to the Neal case below. 
The terms of white spatial management are not delivered through a 
singular message. They ebb and flow between romanticisation and 
condemnation of Indigenous people. To be solely aggressive would 
undermine the imagined social harmony created within national borders. 
Therefore, colonisers match moments of lawlessness with lawfulness 
‘through the elaboration of a new fantasised form of social harmony’, 
according to Rutherford.107 In criminal sentencing, both goodwill and 
reprimand are variously imposed on the Indigenous offender to create an 
image of a social order in control. In riot cases, sentencing courts have 
embraced the riot as a measure of human progress that is compatible with 
white society’s aspirations. Alternatively, they have romanticised the 
paternalism and segregation policy of white society to contrast with the 
uncontrolled rioter and deviant Indigenous subject.108 This antinomy in 
sentencing is symptomatic of ‘Australian cultural formations’ in which 
‘power to do good’ through social engineering has ‘deprived Aboriginal 
Australians at every turn’.109 The Frankfurt School suggests that the state acts 
out a paternal role in which its caring nature becomes disciplinarian when 
the relationship between the nation and the subject deteriorates.110 For Hage, 
this epitomises the tendencies of Australian nationalism between ‘evil white’ 
and ‘good white’ nationalism.111 
Early Judicial Portrayals of Indigenous Rioters: Entitled to be 
Agitators 
Neal v The Queen (1982) is one of the few High Court cases to consider the 
relevance of Indigenous group membership to sentencing considerations. 
The court found that it could reduce the sentence because Indigenous 
background was relevant to the moral culpability of the offender and the 
                                                           
106  Wilson (1982). 
107  Rutherford (2000), p 57. 
108  Cairns Magistrates Court, quoted in Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 325; 
Bathurst District Court’s sentencing remarks for Brewarrina rioters Bates and Murray, 
quoted in Lewis (1991a), p 6. 
109  Rutherford (2000), p 27. 
110  See Fromm (1963); Adorno et al (1950).  
111  Hage (1998), p 79; see also Hage (2003), p 39. 
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seriousness of the offence.112 Neal v The Queen involved an Indigenous 
offender who committed a violent offence after being provoked by racism. 
The circumstances of the offence were a confrontation on the Yarrabah 
Aboriginal Reserve between Mr Collins, a non-Indigenous officer of the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs and store manager on the reserve, and the 
accused, Percy Conrad Neal, the elected chairman of the Yarrabah 
Community Council on the reserve. Neal had campaigned against the 
paternalistic treatment of Indigenous people on the reserve by white 
authorities, and sought to institute Aboriginal self-management, which was a 
political issue for Indigenous communities across Australia. The deep-seated 
grievances over the paternalist environment found expression when Collins 
sold rotten meat to the Indigenous people on the reserve. With twelve other 
Indigenous people, Neal sought out Collins at his home. While the others 
waited on the street, Neal had an argument about reserve management. He 
swore at Collins, telling him that he was racist and that he and all other 
whites should get off Yarrabah reserve. He then spat in Collins’ face. For 
this, Neal was convicted of unlawful entry and assault.113 
At first instance, a Cairns magistrate sentenced Neal to imprisonment 
for two months. The magistrate criticised the political statement behind the 
act of resistance: ‘Your actions in taking unto yourself the task of removing 
all whites from Yarrabah cannot be condoned from any angle.’114 He blamed 
Neal for the racial tensions between black and white society: ‘Violence is 
something in recent times which has crept into Aboriginal communities: I 
blame your type for this growing hatred of black against white.’115 Neal was 
regarded as upsetting ‘the harmonious running of these communities’.116 This 
reflects, as Hage suggests, a fantasy of the invisible yet racialised European 
hegemony.117 Hage points to Goffman’s idea that ‘illusions and impressions’ 
about space are ‘necessary for the construction of the self’.118 It is the judicial 
‘presentation of the self’ as tolerant that is superimposed on white 
Australia’s treatment of Others.119 Equally, the image of harmony is 
threatened when the Other fails to acquiesce to the hegemony. 
The Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal, upon hearing Neal’s appeal, 
increased the sentence to six months’ imprisonment on the basis that the 
two-month sentence was manifestly inadequate for such an offence that 
involved ‘a mob’.120 Neal successfully appealed to the High Court, which 
reinstated the magistrate’s two-month sentence. Two of the four judges, 
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Gibbs CJ and Wilson J, allowed Neal’s appeal on the technical basis that the 
Court of Criminal Appeal was acting ultra vires by extending the sentence.121 
All judges accepted that racial tensions on reserves were legitimate 
sentencing considerations. Wilson J held that the magistrate’s sentence 
appropriately took into account the ‘frustration and emotional concern 
engendered in [Neal] by the manner in which the reserves were administered 
and his endeavour to obtain self-management’.122 Like Wilson J, Brennan J 
personalised the act by focusing on the ‘emotional stress’ created by the 
‘paternalistic system’ of the reserve, which affected Neal.123 Nonetheless, 
Brennan J appreciated that it did not arise from ‘any ill-feeling between 
Messrs Collins and Neal personally’, but was a ‘dramatic and emotional 
confrontation’ produced ‘by a deeply-felt objection to departmental control 
of the reserve’.124 The objection was a ‘material factor’ that went to ‘the 
reason why Mr Neal engaged in that conduct’ and reduced the ‘gravity for 
the offence’.125 In an oft-quoted statement, Brennan J pointed to the 
importance of Indigenous circumstances in sentencing considerations:  
In imposing sentences courts are bound to take into account, in 
accordance with those principles, all material facts including those 
facts which exist only by reason of the offender's membership of an 
ethnic or other group. So much is essential to the even administration 
of criminal justice.126 
The treatment of Aboriginal people on the reserve and Neal’s 
grievances were relevant to moral culpability and a reduced sentence. 
Brennan J accepted that Neal was ‘entitled lawfully to advocate political or 
administrative changes without penalty’.127 Murphy J went further in tracing 
the ‘Aboriginal sense of grievance’ that ‘developed over the two hundred 
years of white settlement in Australia’, with its ‘arrogant superiority’ and 
‘considerable brutality’.128 This resonates with Cowlishaw’s observations that 
Indigenous riots emerge from a ‘colonial rage’.129 Murphy J recognised that 
‘Aborigines have a right to participate in and direct their own policies’ and 
protest against the ‘reserve conditions and race relations’, which are to be 
treated as special mitigating factors in a sentence.130 He cited US experience 
where ‘persons frustrated by powerlessness through the exercise of racist 
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policies and practices … sometimes express [grievances] in the only way 
possible – by protest or violence’.131 Murphy J further stated that Neal as an 
agitator was ‘in good company’ and ‘agitators are so absolutely necessary’ 
for ‘human progress’ and ‘advance towards civilisation’.132 Brennan and 
Murphy JJ’s comments remind us that the space of the reserve is not fixed, 
but a ‘shared space’ that ‘emerges relationally’.133 Paul Carter reflects on the 
formation of public space not as governed by the law but as a ‘mobile and 
self-constituting’ set of exchanges between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
systems.134 
Ultimately, Murphy J treated sentencing mitigation as a vehicle for 
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. He gave 
meaning to Hudson’s theory that sentencing should involve ‘society 
acknowledg[ing] responsibility’ for the circumstances that led to the 
offending.135 Murphy J was in favour of imposing a non-custodial sentence, 
as a prison sentence would ‘not improve race relations but will tend to 
embitter them’.136 For Murphy J, the inferior status of Indigenous people vis-
à-vis the white victim in a position of authority was a special mitigating 
consideration:  
Taking into account the racial relations aspect of this case, the fact 
that Mr Neal was placed in a position of inferiority to the whites 
managing the Reserve should have been a special mitigating factor in 
determining sentence.137 
All judges of the High Court enunciated that the stress of racism on the 
offender reduced the seriousness of the offence.138 However, with the 
exception of Murphy J, the court regarded the space of Yarrabah Reserve as 
a white legal space, with tolerance for difference in this space something the 
white system bestowed on Indigenous people. As Hage notes, white notions 
of cultural diversity hinge on whites possessing the terms of its existence, 
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rather than cultural diversity undercutting whiteness.139 Similar social 
fantasies of tolerance to difference are created in the sentencing of the 
Brewarrina rioters. 
Sentencing Brewarrina ʻRiotersʼ in the Aftermath of Boneyʼs 
Death in Custody 
The catalyst for the Brewarrina riot of 1987 was the death in custody of a 
local Indigenous man and the perceived failure of the justice system to bring 
the responsible police to account. Brewarrina is a small town of about 1000 
people in North-Western New South Wales, with a large and impoverished 
Aboriginal population. It is a town not unlike Bourke, which Cowlishaw 
characterises as beset by ongoing spatial contests between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous residents.140 The backdrop to the riot was anger at the 
forthcoming celebrations of Australia’s Bicentenary at Brewarrina, the over-
policing of Indigenous people and a growing movement against a spate of 
Aboriginal deaths in custody across Australia. A number of rioters would 
stand trial and their sentencing submissions would highlight the death in 
custody as the precursor to the riot. In 1991, the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal reviewed the sentences of a number of the rioters, and 
regarded the death in custody and high-level policing as mitigating factors.141 
The Death in Custody and Moral Panics 
Leading up to the riot, policing had intensified in Brewarrina in anticipation 
of protests against Australia’s Bicentennial celebrations.142 During this time, 
Lloyd James Boney, a 28-year-old Indigenous man, died in police custody. 
Boney was found hanging by a football sock in a police cell one and a half 
hours after he was arrested for breaching bail conditions.143 The Indigenous 
community was suspicious of the police involvement in the death, and 
demanded a proper inquiry and justice to be served against the police. The 
community took the view that it was physically impossible for Boney to kill 
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himself by hanging in his heavily intoxicated state.144 Also, as a ‘happy-go-
lucky guy’, Boney was seen as lacking the disposition for suicide.145 At the 
same time, Boney had expressed fear that the police would kill him.146 There 
was growing publicity across Australia about both Aboriginal deaths in 
custody and police mistreatment of Aboriginal people. The Committee to 
Defend Black Rights had been monitoring deaths in custody in 1987 and 
found an average of one death every eleven days, which had led to calls for a 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.147 Boney was the 
sixteenth Aboriginal death and the final straw that would lead to the federal 
government forming a Royal Commission.148 The Commission later found 
that there was a ‘widespread view’ among Indigenous people that Boney’s 
death was part of a pattern of Indigenous deaths in custody.149 
The Indigenous community at Brewarrina was outraged by the police 
removing Boney’s body to Bourke before notifying his family of his death 
and also at what they saw as police lies about attempting to organise bail for 
Boney, according to the Royal Commission.150 These events ‘aroused 
suspicion of a cover-up of a killing’.151 There was an overnight internal 
investigation into the death, involving only one interview conducted by the 
Internal Security Unit with a police officer. The findings were that Boney 
had committed suicide with ‘no suggestion at all of foul play in any sense’ 
on the part of the police.152 Consequently, there was a strong view in the 
community that justice would not be served through lawful channels. 
In the week following Boney’s death, a series of protests took place 
outside the police station. When riot-clad police with shields and batons 
turned up to Boney’s wake, and in doing so flouted an agreement between 
the Western Aboriginal Legal Service and the police, the ‘Brewarrina riot’ 
materialised.153 In response, about 20 mourners armed themselves with iron 
bars and fence posts and shouted, ‘Black people have been killed by white 
people for more than 200 years’.154 The riot lasted for about 40 minutes, 
during which the rioters broke windows at the local hotel.155 Two police 
officers were taken to hospital, with one sustaining a broken leg.156 There 
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was one report of an Indigenous man in the riot who was taken to hospital. 
Most injuries sustained by Indigenous people, including by those sentenced 
for the riot, went unreported.157 
Seventeen Indigenous people – labelled the ‘Brewarrina 17’ – were 
arrested for riot and riot-related offences.158 The most serious charges and 
convictions for riotous assembly and assaulting police were laid against 
‘ringleaders’ Arthur Murray (an Aboriginal elder who was a campaigner for 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and whose son 
had died in police custody in 1981), Soney Bates (Lloyd Boney’s brother-in-
law) and Glen Boney (Lloyd Boney’s cousin).159 The ensuing moral panic in 
the mainstream media highlighted the violence of the riot and the role of its 
protagonists. The media focused on the uncontrollable and intoxicated state 
of the rioters,160 which was televised during the trials.161 Headlines read 
‘Blood on the Street: the Night a Town Exploded’162 and ‘Police Hurt in 
Clash with Aborigines’.163 AAP reported that ‘a mob of aborigines attacked 
police in an outback town’.164 Journalists described how beer bottles were 
stacked in the park as weapons and ammunition.165 
However, some media reports were balanced with a portrayal of the 
death in custody and the police provocation as underlying the protest. This 
nuanced narrative would later manifest in the sentencing remarks for 
Murray, Bates and Boney. Reports identified the death in custody and police 
racism as precursors to the riot.166 The Sydney Morning Herald described the 
riot as an act of resistance to the death in custody, poor living conditions and 
200 years of Aboriginal abuse.167 The article stated that the violence was that 
‘practised by oppressed groups at “the end of their tether”’ to beg ‘the 
dominant group to take notice of their inhuman plight’.168 A journalist 
questioned official reports of the numbers of Indigenous rioters, claiming it 
was closer to 30 than the 150 that the police alleged.169 In its front-page 
story, the Sydney Morning Herald quoted James Boney, Lloyd’s brother, 
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who alleged that the police had been harassing his family and that 
Aboriginal people were looked upon as ‘less than human’.170 
Court of Criminal Appealʼs Latitude for Context of Death in Custody 
The Bathurst District Court’s first instance sentence for rioters Bates and 
Murray emphasised the violent, unpredictable and unstable nature of the 
Indigenous community at Brewarrina.171 The court, whose remarks were 
directly quoted in the media, did not portray the riot as a reasoned response 
to the death in custody, despite the contemporaneous handing down of the 
Royal Commission’s report on Boney’s death, recommending disciplinary 
action against the police officers.172 Indeed, the court directed the jury to 
ignore the death in custody as a causal factor and the commission’s 
findings.173 The court depicted Murray and Bates as responsible for 
disturbing community harmony by promoting hatred of police. The court 
reflected on the harmonious Aboriginal–white relations in the ‘old days’ of 
the 1950s and 1960s, when whites controlled Indigenous lives and ‘whites 
and blacks’ lived ‘happily together’.174 The worsening of race relations was 
evidenced by Indigenous people attacking police in what ‘could only be 
described as a completely unprovoked and violent riot’.175 In handing down 
eighteen-month prison sentences for riotous assembly, the court concluded 
that the rioters had been affected by alcohol in carrying out their ‘half-hour 
of madness’.176 This reasoning reveals the District Court’s capacity for 
fantasy creation about a harmony that is based on the invisibility of white 
racial dominance alongside a narrative that makes Indigenous deviance 
visible.177 
The appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal against 
the convictions and sentences of Bates and Murray, and the sentence of Glen 
Boney, focused on District Court Nash J’s alleged biased interventions and 
his failure to consider the death in custody as a mitigating sentencing 
consideration.178 The Court of Criminal Appeal found that Nash J gave an 
‘unhelpful review of the evidence’ that ‘weighed unfairly against the 
accused’ and gave the ‘impression that World War III was taking place in 
Brewarrina that night’.179 It was critical of the District Court’s idealising of 
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the ‘virtuous’ past of racial discrimination and its blaming of Indigenous 
people for the problems relating to the tense relations with non-Indigenous 
people. For the appellate court, the problems confronting the Indigenous 
community could be explained with reference to its harsh treatment by non-
Indigenous society, including by the police. It put the death in custody at the 
forefront of assessing the offenders’ conduct.180 Ultimately, the convictions 
were quashed due to the bias of the District Court and the insufficient 
numbers to constitute a riot.181 Nonetheless, the court accepted that the death 
in custody should have been a relevant factor: 
It would have been quite unrealistic for the jury to have considered 
the specific blows alleged to have been inflicted by each of the 
accused upon which the riot charge was based without knowledge of 
the initial reason for which the crowd had gathered (following the 
funeral of the Aboriginal man who died in police custody).182 
The other defendant, Glen Boney, appealed against his six-month 
prison sentence on the basis that the Bathurst District Court gave him a 
disproportionate sentence compared with the other rioters, and failed to 
account for the death in custody in mitigation. The Court of Criminal Appeal 
described the death in custody as a mitigating factor for Boney’s offence of 
assaulting police. It noted the ‘close emotional relationship between the 
applicant and the deceased [Lloyd Boney] in that they had been raised, 
effectively, as brothers’.183 Accordingly, the death had a significant personal 
impact on the defendant, which should have been considered in the sentence. 
Grove J of the Court of Appeal recognised that ‘a number of people had 
acquired a notion that the death of Lloyd Boney had, in some fashion, been 
facilitated or even brought about by acts of police officers’.184 Grove J held 
that many of the ‘adherents to the[se] beliefs’ were part of the ‘large crowd 
of mourners’ at the funeral.185 Ultimately, Boney was released, having served 
75 days, because the ‘subjective consideration of the applicant’s close 
relationship to the person believed to have died unnecessarily must have 
borne some weight’.186 
The contrast between the District Court’s reasoning and that of the 
appeal court reveals how new fantasies of social harmony vacillate, as 
Rutherford suggests, between moments of lawlessness and lawfulness in the 
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law’s narratives about Indigenous offenders.187 Rutherford explains this 
schizophrenic national psyche through the lens of Jacques Lacan’s 
psychoanalysis.188 The contrary forces of transgressing the limit of the 
pleasure principle and enforcing it through the law ‘facilitates an analysis of 
Australian morality and of its counterpart: an aggression to the internal and 
external Other’.189 In its sentencing considerations, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal acknowledged the fraught relations between the police and 
Indigenous communities that placed considerable stress on offenders as 
relevant to reducing the culpability of the offender and the seriousness of the 
offence. The court regarded the Indigenous community as having legitimate 
grievances in relation to the death in custody. It displayed sympathy for the 
circumstances of the community and the offenders, while denouncing the 
District Court’s view that Indigenous people should be blamed for their 
hardship. For the Court of Criminal Appeal, the moral cause of the 
Brewarrina rioters due to their personal loss and political grievances was a 
means to lessen their culpability. 
The remainder of this article addresses how courts sentencing recent 
‘riot’ offenders have tended to focus on the seriousness of the riot offence 
rather than culpability, and have reimagined the Indigenous community 
grievance leading up to the riot – namely, the death in custody – as an 
illegitimate ground for mitigation. It reveals the foreboding aspect of the 
Australian psyche where the fantasy of a universal white culture denies the 
validity of specific Indigenous concerns. 
Punitive Approaches to Sentencing Redfern ʻRiotersʼ After the 
Death of TJ Hickey 
Redfern Riot and Media Portrayals 
At least since the late 1960s, the Indigenous community at Redfern has been 
subject to over-policing and police aggression, and has responded with 
resistance.190 The ‘Redfern riot’ that took place on the night of 15 February 
2004 was not an isolated event, but rather a culmination of tense 
Indigenous–police relations and white claims to The Block.191 The high-level 
policing of Redfern has perpetuated ‘notions of risk and ever-present 
danger’192 and ‘enabled a widespread expectation and acceptance that The 
Block must go’.193 The Block is seen as belonging to whiteness and existing 
                                                           
187  Rutherford (2000), p 57. 
188  Rutherford (2000), p 27. 
189  Rutherford (2000), p 27 (emphasis added). 
190  The over-policing of Redfern, including police raids throughout the 1990s, sparked public 
protests and widespread policy debates: Cunneen (2001), pp 99–100; see also Tickner 
(1982); Cunneen (1990). 
191  Funnell (2005). 
192  Shaw (2009), p 432. 
193  Shaw (2000), pp 298–99. 
ANTHONY: SENTENCING INDIGENOUS RIOTER OFFENDERS 405 
 
in white space.194 While Indigenous people’s resistance to white claims and 
policing often manifests in ‘quiet persistence’ to hold on to their space,195 it 
can also erupt in contestation, as occurred after Thomas ‘TJ’ Hickey’s death. 
Hickey was a seventeen-year-old Indigenous boy who lived at Redfern and 
was impaled on a fence as a result of a police chase that was observed by 
Indigenous community members. The community widely believes that the 
police were responsible for the death.196 Within a few hours of TJ’s death, 
posters were put around Redfern stating ‘WANTED Child Murderers’ and 
featuring pictures of the police.197 Ray Jackson, an Aboriginal community 
liaison officer, claimed that ‘the police actually rammed the young kid’. TJ’s 
mother, Gail Hickey, said ‘these dogs [the police] … kill[ed] my son’.198 TJ’s 
friends and family maintained that he was terrified of the police as a result of 
being beaten by the police a few weeks earlier.199 
The Redfern riot lasted approximately six hours.200 The Police Minister 
stated that the police were never ‘overwhelmed’ by the rioters,201 although 
eight required hospital treatment.202 The pre-emptive mobilisation of riot 
police to Redfern on the day of TJ’s death has been regarded as provoking 
the riot.203 Birch claims that witnesses to the riot said ‘the police had not only 
incited the initial confrontation but had themselves acted violently’.204 The 
mainstream media focused on the blameworthiness of the Indigenous 
‘rioters’ and neglected the grievances of the rioters. Cohen has pointed out 
that moral panics place issues that have long been in existence suddenly in 
the ‘limelight’ in order to convey a sense of impulsive irrationality.205 The 
moral panic pervaded the Daily Telegraph’s reporting, which stressed the 
unjustified violence by an ‘uncontrollable mob’206 and vehemently defended 
the police against suggestions that they were to blame for TJ’s death.207 
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The media represented the police’s role in the riot purely in terms of 
victimisation from ‘hordes of Aborigines’.208 Police were championed as 
sacrificing ‘their well-being to return order to the streets’.209 In defence of the 
police, the Daily Telegraph made a call for the ‘[Indigenous] participants of 
this outrageous incident … [to] be identified and prosecuted’.210 These 
sentiments in the media were echoed in the report of Strike Force Coburn, 
which the police instigated to investigate the ‘civil disobedience at 
Redfern’.211 It emphasised the out-of-control and drunken mob. Funnell 
claims that the report revealed a ‘complete neglect of the underlying causes 
of the riot’.212 The only ‘cause’ countenanced by the mainstream media was 
the sense of helplessness among the Redfern Indigenous community due to 
‘depression, drug and alcohol addiction, and a life of petty criminality’.213 
Mike Carlton wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald that the community was 
‘lashed by scourges of alcohol, heroin, prostitution, crime, illiteracy, 
innumeracy and ignorance’.214 This imagery of irrational despair prevented 
understandings of the ‘riot’ as a reasoned response to police involvement in 
TJ’s death. It also enforced a narrative that The Block had spiralled into 
‘uncontrollable lawlessness and incivility’ to justify plans for its closure.215 
Shaw argues that ‘“Whiteness” was threatened during the riot as [its] control 
was lost’.216 Accordingly, new fantasies emerged about the need for police to 
be defended in sentencing.  
Trials and Sentencing of the Redfern Rioters 
Fourteen people were charged following the Redfern riot, with the offences 
of riot, affray, violent disorder, throwing a missile and assaulting police. The 
two cases that were reported in the media were those of Marilyn Cargill, 
who was TJ’s aunt, and Raymond Carr, TJ’s cousin. The audio recording of 
the review of Cargill’s sentence was accessed from the New South Wales 
District Court; all other sentencing remarks were quoted in mainstream 
newspapers. Initially, Redfern Local Court refused Cargill bail due to the 
seriousness of the offence because of the threats made against police, and 
despite her plea for permission to attend TJ’s funeral and the court’s 
recognition of the loss of her nephew.217 Notwithstanding ‘vague and 
unspecific’ evidence, based on police testimony linking Cargill to the riot, 
she was convicted and imprisoned for one year due to the seriousness of the 
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offence.218 The District Court held that her anger at the death was not 
relevant.219 When her sentence was reviewed after three months, following a 
parole and probation report recommendation, the District Court released 
Cargill from prison citing mental health problems and the fact that Cargill 
‘regarded the young person TJ Hickey as a son and was most distressed in 
regards to his death’.220 
The deemed ringleader of the riot,221 Raymond Carr, was also charged 
with riot, affray, throwing bottles at police and maliciously damaging a 
police car. Carr told the Central Local Court in Sydney that he threw bottles 
at police and cars because ‘he was angry at the death of Thomas Hickey’.222 
Magistrate Moore refused bail, saying the defendant played ‘a significant 
role’ in the Redfern riot and the seriousness of the offence was to prevail 
over the reasons that explained his culpability.223 His prison sentence of 
twelve months reflected the objective seriousness of the offence.224 On 
appeal, the District Court refused to consider mitigating evidence of TJ’s 
death during the police chase. The court focused on the harm that Carr 
caused, stating that the sentence ‘was about as low’ as he could hand down, 
given that he smashed a vehicle window and brandished pavers at police.225 
Although the quotes from the judgments are mostly based on selective 
media reporting, it appears from the Cargill and Raymond cases that the 
courts were mindful foremost of the seriousness of the offence. While the 
District Court gave some leniency to the personal despair caused by TJ’s 
death, it was not raised in relation to the grievances underpinning the riot. 
Rather, the riot was presented as a serious event and its portrayal lacked 
reference to the spatial contest and particularly the Indigenous right to such 
space. In this way, the court was playing the role of the ‘spatial manager’, 
who constructs the Other as ‘standing between them and their imaginary 
nation’.226 Hage describes spatial managers as seeking to remove 
‘undesirable’ Others from ‘national [white] space’.227 Courts not only have 
the discursive power to manage space, but also the punitive capacity for 
enforcement, which was used unhesitatingly with the Redfern rioters. This 
power would be taken a step further in sentencing the protesters to 
Mulrunji’s death in custody on Palm Island.  
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The Palm Island Protest and the Denial of the Death in Custody 
in Sentencing 
In the sentencing of the Palm Island riot offenders of 2004, the Queensland 
Court of Criminal Appeal and District Court ruled that the death in custody 
of Mulrunji was not a relevant consideration. This position converged with a 
moral panic about the riot and its disorderly Indigenous participants who 
were without a legitimate cause. The judicial remarks and media reports 
reflected a broader social misgiving about the riot and the dysfunctional 
status of the Indigenous community on Palm Island. However, the media and 
sentencing process did not identify this tumultuous history, but focused on 
the irrationality and uncivilised nature of the rioters and the serious harm 
caused by the riot. In reality, the riot merely brought into the ‘limelight’228 
the historical problems on Palm Island, including in relation to punitive 
policing, which are a legacy of the Island’s formation as a penal colony for 
Indigenous people in the 1920s.229  
Background to the Palm Island Riot and Media Indignation 
Mulrunji, 36, a widely respected Palm Island community member who had 
virtually no criminal record, died 40 minutes after being arrested for 
offensive language.230 On 19 November 2004, Sergeant Chris Hurley arrested 
and detained Mulrunji in Palm Island police station, where he died as a result 
of sustaining a black eye, four broken ribs, a ruptured liver and portal vein. 
The following day, Sergeant Hurley’s ‘mates’ who had been connected with 
the police command investigated the death and Hurley’s role.231 The 
‘relationships between the investigating police officers and the police officer 
under investigation’232 sent a message to the Indigenous community that 
injustice would prevail. Anger within the community intensified when 
Indigenous people were told that Mulrunji’s death occurred accidentally 
when he slipped on a step.233 
Public meetings were held in the following week to discuss the death 
and prejudicial investigation. This culminated in a protest on 26 November 
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2004 in which approximately 300 people (one-eighth of the Palm Island 
population) assembled at the police station demanding that the police leave. 
The Queensland government sent 80 Tactical Response Group commandos 
to the island.234 The gathering threw stones and mangoes at the police 
building and yelled abuse at the police. The police officers were armed, 
pointed rifles on the crowd and were prepared to fire.235 The officers 
ultimately retreated to the hospital. Over the next three hours, the barracks, 
police station and courthouse, ‘which were all part of a fairly modest 
complex of prefabricated buildings’, burnt down.236 Some officers sustained 
minor injuries but there were no serious injuries. Nonetheless, the 
Queensland Police Union, Queensland Police Commissioner and 
Queensland government ran a concerted campaign to highlight their 
sacrificial police role in the riot. This went hand in hand with the campaign 
to absolve Hurley of any wrongdoing associated with Mulrunji’s death and 
to undermine the prosecution against him.237 Newspapers reported ‘Police 
Lost Everything in Island Riots, Says Union’238 and ‘[Premier] Beattie 
Defends Police Tactics in Island Riot’.239 
The protest on Palm Island flooded the national media. In the 
mainstream media, it was portrayed as an impulsive event that was incited 
by a ‘mob’ of rioters. No reference was made to the compromised 
investigation into the death in custody and there was scant reference to the 
death in custody that precipitated the riot.240 Headlines such as ‘Palm Island 
Erupts’241 and ‘Palm Island Explodes: Anarchy on Palm Island on Knife’s 
Edge Overnight’242 cast the rioters as uncontrollable and irrational, without 
cause or reason. The media constructed the riot as spontaneous and 
excessive, rather than as arising from legitimate grievances in relation to the 
police.243 The pathos of the community and its deplorable living conditions 
were also highlighted.244 As with the Redfern riot, the police were depicted 
as being terrorised by the Palm Island mob.245 Newspaper headlines that 
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reflected this included ‘How Rioters Set Trap for Police – Unarmed Officers 
Feared They Would Die as 300 Rampaged Trap for Police’246 and ‘Police 
Tell of Terror’.247 While this approach resonated with the judicial reasoning 
in sentencing the rioters, it was positioned in terms of the principles of the 
seriousness of the offence for the police victims. 
Nullification of the Death in Custody in Sentencing Palm Island 
Rioters  
The Palm Island riot resulted in a number of participants being charged with 
offences, including assaulting police, riotous assembly and rioting causing 
destruction. Lex Wotton was the most widely publicised protester, and 
would ultimately receive the harshest penalty (discussed below), but it was 
not his sentence that provided the precedent. The main appeal to the 
Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal was brought by the Attorney-General 
against the sentences of Jason Poynter, Alissa Norman and Russell Parker on 
the grounds that the sentence of the Townsville District Court failed ‘to 
reflect the seriousness of the offence’.248 At first instance, the District Court 
had accounted for the death in custody as a relevant sentencing factor. For 
instance, in relation to Norman, the court noted that she attended the meeting 
that led to the ‘riot’ ‘out of a genuine interest in how the death had 
occurred’. It noted that ‘she shared the crowd’s frustration … that their 
concerns really had not been dealt with, that they really had not been fully 
informed’ of the issues surrounding the death in custody.249 
The Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the Attorney-
General’s appeal to the sentences and provided a clear statement that that 
death in custody was not a relevant sentencing consideration, given the 
seriousness of the riot offence and police victimisation. The court denounced 
the rioters for targeting ‘members of the police service, the very agency 
charged to maintain the security of persons and their property’,250 while 
failing to recognise the gathering’s grievance that such protection had not 
been afforded to Mulrunji. This victimisation rendered the riot ‘distinctly 
grave’.251 At the same time, the court accepted that there were no serious 
injuries (the worst being a fractured rib), and the greatest threat was to the 
rioters themselves.252 The court quoted a victim’s impact statement by a 
police officer that recalled that he had ‘made a cold, logical decision to fire 
into a large crowd if necessary’.253 However, it was the threat that the riot 
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presented to the police that was the significant consideration in sentencing.254 
The court referred to the 60 pages of victim impact statements provided by 
police officers that described ‘the terror they experienced’ and how they 
‘feared for their lives, with some telephoning family members to say 
goodbye’.255  
The Court of Criminal Appeal noted repeatedly the need to deter riot 
offenders and the Indigenous community generally from committing such 
offences.256 McMurdo P described riots as ‘terrifying and destructive’ and 
said the Palm Island riot was a ‘notorious event in Queensland’s history’ that 
could not be allowed to occur again.257 De Jersey CJ quoted R v 
McCormack258 on the necessity of a custodial sentence for riot offenders to 
promote deterrence: ‘[C]ourts have commonly regarded an attack on the 
police in the execution of their duty as calling for custodial sentence with a 
deterrent component.’259 The court’s approach to deterrence assumed that 
the rioters were acting with free and individual agency,260 and overlooked the 
context that impelled the protest. The court viewed the offence as based on a 
simple calculation that, with the threat of harsh punishment, it would not be 
repeated. 
Ultimately, the court decided that the death in custody was not a 
relevant sentencing consideration. The court stated that the fact that ‘one 
police officer is perceived – whether or not with justification – to have done 
a terribly bad thing, does not justify the wholesale, violent, condemnation of 
the contingent of which he forms part’.261 McMurdo P remarked that 
‘Mulrunji's death … and its subsequent investigation … does not excuse the 
rioters’ resort to lawlessness in pursuit of their cause’.262 He went on to note 
that the ‘rioters could have expressed their concerns through lawful 
channels’.263 After all, they had been told that ‘an inquiry was underway and 
the matter was to be referred to the Crime and Misconduct Commission’.264 
De Jersey CJ stated unequivocally that the death in custody lacked 
significance: 
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Mr Devereaux SC, who appeared for the respondent Parker, 
submitted that ‘the riot in this case was not directed at police as a 
result of their carrying out their lawful duty, but was a response to 
perceived unlawful fatal violence by a police officer on a community 
member’. That may be, but for sentencing purposes, the point lacks 
significance.265 
The court stressed that ‘mob conduct at the police station was a reaction 
which could not be tolerated in a civilized community’.266 It pointed to 
‘recent and not so recent world history [that] illustrates the immense danger 
wrought by riots’ and their potential to lead to ‘anarchy’.267 Therefore, the 
Indigenous community was imagined not only as lacking a cause, but also as 
lacking civilisation. The court’s imagery of an uncivilised anarchical mob 
terrorising defenceless police dovetails the media’s language and reflects the 
social perception that the Indigenous community lacked reason or restraint. 
This message was carried through in the sentencing of Lex Wotten.  
Application of Decontextualised Sentencing Approach to Lex Wotton 
Lex Wotton was regarded as the ringleader of the Palm Island riot, although 
the courts did not establish whether he was an instigator or conciliator 
between the rioters and police.268 He was charged under section 65 of the 
Criminal Code (Qld) for partaking in a riot in which a building was 
destroyed. Of the Palm Islanders involved in the protest, Wotton was 
charged with the most severe offence. The 37-year-old was a long-term 
Indigenous activist and community leader who was involved in 
rehabilitation and healing programs.269 These facts were taken into account in 
relation to Wotton’s character, but not in relation to understanding Wotton’s 
culpability in the riot itself.270 Nonetheless, the police described him as a 
serious offender and sought to make an example of him by pressing the most 
severe charges. Indeed, police identified Wotton ‘as the person that they 
would shoot first’ if the riot turned sour.271 Ultimately, Wotton would receive 
the longest sentence of all the rioters. 
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In December 2008, four years after the riot, the Townsville District 
Court sentenced Wotton to six years’ imprisonment, eligible for parole after 
two years. In the meantime, Wotton had faced a trial by media, adverse 
police publicity and criticisms by courts hearing preliminary matters that he 
was ‘morally wrong’.272 The District Court followed the Queensland Court of 
Criminal Appeal in R v Poynter, Norman & Parker (2006) by disavowing 
the circumstances of the death in custody and the mishandled investigation, 
and focusing instead on deterrence and the seriousness of the offence, 
especially as police officers were victims. The District Court noted: 
the Court of Appeal has indicated that the background to this matter 
[ie the death in custody] is not particularly relevant for the purpose 
of the sentence. The reason for that, in my view, is the serious nature 
of the offence itself, rioting with destruction.273 
The District Court recognised that the ‘history and disadvantages of 
Palm Island’ – which include widespread poverty, unemployment and illness 
– ‘[are] not something for which successive administrations of this State and 
the Commonwealth could in any way be proud’.274 This acknowledgement 
did not result in sentencing mitigation, but merely recognition of the 
helplessness of the population that was beyond repair. Shanahan J concluded 
that ‘it is a community that faces a number of serious problems and has for a 
number of years’.275 The riot was viewed as part of these problems276 rather 
than as being caused by the problems and an expression of the ongoing 
spatial contest on the island. The court’s attribution of the riot to the 
Indigenous community rather than problems arising from white control 
contrasts with the High Court’s reasoning in Neal v The Queen, in which 
Indigenous dissent was a valid response to white authority.277 The District 
Court and the Queensland Court of Appeal primarily considered the serious 
danger that the riot presented to ‘ideal’278 police victims and the uncivilised 
nature of the Palm Island community.279 These characterisations of 
Indigenous people as uncivilised are matched with, in the words of Hage, 
attempts at ‘domestication’ to bring nature in line with humans.280 This 
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judicial mindset only leaves room for punitive sentencing that seeks to teach 
the offender a lesson through a lengthy prison sentence.  
Concluding Remarks 
Within sentencing legislation and common law principles, there is broad 
scope to consider the circumstances of the offence to assess the culpability 
of the offender. Indeed, individualised justice is regarded as a lynchpin of 
the Australian sentencing regime. This approach can result in courts creating 
fantasises about white tolerance for Indigenous grievances and providing 
mitigation. It depends on the myth of the universality of white space that 
allows some difference at the margins. However, such fantasies are Janus-
faced with, as Hage and Rutherford alert us, the side of ‘good’ nationalist 
sentiments easily turning to the side of ‘evil nationalism’ when morality 
converges with desires for white integration.281 Recent sentencing remarks 
dealing with Indigenous rioters have privileged considerations of the 
seriousness of the offence with reference to the harm to police victims over a 
consideration of the violent circumstances provoking the riot. These courts 
have referred to the rioters as out of control and uncivilised. They have 
retreated from attributing the rioters with a legitimate political grievance as 
the High Court did in Neal and the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal did in the Brewarrina cases. The Indigenous community now is cast 
as presenting a serious danger to society due to its impulsive violence 
directed at the police.  
In reimagining the Indigenous community in order to lengthen prison 
sentences, courts set up a number of culturally contingent binaries. The 
danger of the Indigenous people’s offence is contrasted with the innocence 
of police victims. The disorder of the Indigenous community is contrasted 
with the law and order provided by the police. The uncivilised anarchy of the 
Indigenous community is contrasted with the civilisation of the police. 
Pervading these binaries is the enforcement of neutral sentencing principles 
of serious harm and victimisation that ostensibly remove considerations of 
Indigenous difference. However, when applied, they give rise to longer 
sentences for Indigenous offenders by ignoring factors that may reduce their 
culpability including the circumstances of the death in custody in the context 
of over-policing Indigenous spaces. Cowlishaw comments in her analysis of 
the 1997 Bourke riot case that: ‘In the highly ritualized legal arena there was 
no moment when the rioters’ rage could be attended to, and no possibility of 
any respect being paid to its genesis or its justification.’282 This is because 
courts have come to focus on the violence and thereby reinforce the threat of 
the Other. Judicial responses and media moral panics in relation to 
Indigenous riots bring into the limelight the underlying nationalist impulse to 
assert a white order over the Other.283 For sentencing courts to take 
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meaningful account of Indigenous factors, they need to be contextualised 
within historical and political contests over space. To do otherwise is to 
pathologise the Indigenous riot and deny its purpose. 
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